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This paper examines how the correlation structure of loan returns within a bank’s loan
portfolio aﬀects its choice of ﬁnancing when the bank faces binding capital constraints and
there is asymmetric information about the quality of its loans. The paper uses an asymmetric
information model similar to Myers and Majluf (1984), where a bank must raise its equity-to-
assets ratio either by issuing equity or by selling loans in the secondary market. The results
suggest that the correlation structure of loan returns can have signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
cost of issuing equity since it aﬀects the variance of a bank’s loan portfolio. However, it is
shown that a bank will always prefer to sell loans instead of equity if it has favorable inside
information for some of its loans and unfavorable information for some of its other loans.
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Financial institutions have sold loans among themselves for over 100 years. Even though this
market existed for many years, it grew slowly until the early 1980s, when it entered a period of
spectacular growth. For example, the volume of loans sold by U.S. banks grew from less than
$20 billion in 1980 to $280 billion in 1989 (Saunders, 1999). Between 1990 and 1994 the volume
of loan sales fell almost equally dramatically, as a result of the credit-crunch associated with the
1990-1991 recession. In recent years, however, the volume of loan sales has expanded again.
The dramatic increase in loan sales during the 1980s gave raise to a voluminous literature
on why banks sell loans, what type of loans they sell, and why did we observe this increase in
loan sales during the 1980s. In general, loan sales occur in many forms (e.g., with or without
recourse1) and for many reasons (e.g., to avoid regulatory taxes, for diversiﬁcation and liquidity
reasons, as a response to market-based capital requirements, for regulatory capital arbitrage,
etc.). Berger and Udell (1993) present a comprehensive review of this literature up to 1993.
More recent studies on this phenomenon include, among others, Carlstrom and Samolyk (1995),
Gordon and Pennacchi (1995), Demsetz (2000), Jones (2000), Dahiya et al. (forthcoming), and
Cebenoyan and Strahan (forthcoming). A detail review of this literature is beyond the scope
of this paper. The discussion here, instead, will focus on studies that motivate loan sales as a
cheaper source of ﬁnance compared to traditional sources like equity and deposits.
The cost of equity is generally perceived to be much greater than the cost of deposits due
to various capital market imperfections. For example, corporate tax beneﬁts, high transaction
costs of issuing equity, and the “bank safety net” (e.g., access to deposit insurance and the dis-
count window) are among the many corporate and regulatory induced imperfections. However,
1If the loan is sold without recourse, not only it is removed from the bank’s balance sheet, but the bank has
no explicit liability if the loan eventually goes bad. Thus, the buyer bears all the credit risk. Instead, if the loan
is sold with recourse, under certain conditions the buyer can put the loan back to the selling bank. Thus, the
bank retains a contingent credit risk liability. In practice, most loans are sold without recourse because a loan
sale is technically removed from the balance sheet only when the buyer has no future credit claim on the bank
(Saunders, 1999).
1asymmetric information and agency costs are probably the most popular explanations. The
seminal contribution by Myers and Majluf (1984) shows that internally generated funds (which
have no issue costs and no information problems) are generally preferred to externally generated
funds. If external funds are needed, deposits are usually preferred to equity. This is because in
the presence of asymmetric information, the bank’s existing shareholders may be reluctant to
issue equity since it may sell at a discount. The more recent literature on loan sales, however,
suggests that in some cases loan sales are cheaper than deposits (and thus equity). For exam-
ple, a bank can reduce its regulatory tax burden by selling assets without recourse. Loan sales
without recourse provide a funding source that is not subject to deposit insurance premiums or
reserve requirements. Also, by shrinking the balance sheet, loan sales allow a bank to reduce its
capital requirement (e.g., Pavel and Phillis, 1987 and Pennacchi, 1988). Instead, loan sales with
recourse or backed by standby letters of credit could provide a cheaper source of funds than
risky-debt, since they have payoﬀ characteristics similar to secured debt (James, 1988).
This paper considers a bank that must raise its equity-to-assets ratio either by selling loans
or by issuing equity. In general, a bank can boost its equity-to-assets ratio by increasing the
numerator of this ratio (i.e., by issuing equity) and/or by decreasing the denominator (i.e., by
selling loans, not initiating new loans, not renewing old loans, etc.). Here, we consider a situation
where the bank can decrease the denominator of its capital ratio only by selling loans without
recourse.2 The paper diﬀers from the ones discussed above in an important way: its focus is on
describing how the correlation structure of loan returns aﬀects the bank’s choice of ﬁnancing. In
the above mentioned papers, only the expected value (and not the correlation structure) of loan
returns enters the analysis. However, in the presence of asymmetric information the correlation
structure of loan returns could have important implications since it aﬀects the cost of issuing
equity. Everything else equal, the more diversiﬁed a loan portfolio is, the less risky it is, and
therefore the higher the price investors are willing to pay for equity.
2From now on, the term loans sales will be used to refer to loan sales without recourse unless otherwise stated.
2The model presented here is similar to the Myers and Majluf (1984) model of equity issues
under asymmetric information. Myers and Majluf (1984) consider the choice between debt and
equity as the source of funding for a new project. The new project is one that will be undertaken
by a ﬁrm whose managers have inside information about its returns; this information is not
available to prospective debt or equity investors. Similarly, in this paper, we consider a bank
that must increase its equity-to-assets ratio either by issuing equity or by selling loans. As in
Myers and Majluf (1984), the bank’s managers have inside information about loan returns that
is not available to prospective loan or equity buyers. It is shown that in a Myers and Majluf
(1984) setup the correlation structure of loan returns has signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the cost of
issuing equity. Everything else equal, the more diversiﬁed a loan portfolio is, the smaller its
variance and thus the higher the price investors are willing to pay for equity (i.e., the less costly
an equity issue is for the bank’s existing shareholders). However, the analysis suggests that as
far as a bank has favorable inside information for some of its loans and unfavorable information
for some of its other loans, it will always prefer to sell loans instead of equity.
Theories of ﬁnancial intermediation predict that loan sales should not be possible, since such
a market would be a “lemons” market (e.g., Boyd and Prescott, 1986 and Diamond, 1984).
However, there are a number of possible explanations why this market exists and why it has not
shut down. For example, there is evidence suggesting that banks oﬀer implicit contract features
that make loan sales incentive compatible (see Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995). In addition, the
loan sales market would not shut down if not all loans supplied in this market are lemons. For
example, loan sales would still occur if some constrained banks are forced to supply proﬁtable
projects. This reasoning is similar to Akerlof’s (Akerlof, 1970) argument that, as long as some
individuals must sell their cars every year, the used car market will not shut down because not
all cars will be lemons. Here, the loan sales market is not a lemons market because constrained
banks (i.e., banks that know that the low quality scenario will prevail in the next period) are
forced to supply loans at a price below their true value.
3The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the assumptions underlying the model.
Section 3 describes the expected payoﬀs from each strategy assuming that the bank is willing
to issue equity or sell any of its loans regardless of which state occurs (i.e., the bank’s choice of
security to sell involves no signaling). Section 4 describes the model’s equilibrium after taking
into account signaling eﬀects, while section 5 concludes. It is important to point out that in
order to keep the analysis tractable the model is highly stylized. However, the paper’s main
point would survive more complicated setups. For this matter, the intuition of the main results
is discussed extensively in a broader context.
2 A model of bank ﬁnancing choice
The model has two periods, period 1 and period 2.3 Consider a bank that has only two loans
outstanding, loan 1 and loan 2. In period 1 we deﬁne LiB to be the book value of loan i and
LiM to be the market value of loan i, where i =1 ,2.D B and EB are the book values of debt
and equity respectively, while DM and EM are the corresponding market values. Clearly,
DB + EB = L1B + L2B (1)
DM + EM = L1M + L2M, (2)
where the market value of each loan is equal to its expected market value in period 2 conditional
on whatever information the market has in period 1. For simplicity, we assume that in period 1
the two loans have the same expected future value
L1M = L2M, (3)
and that the bank’s portfolio is balanced with respect to each loan
L1B = L2B. (4)
3The two periods are meant to capture the state of information available to the market, and not calendar time.
4It is assumed that market and regulatory constraints force the bank to increase its equity-to-
assets ratio from its current level d = EB
L1B+L2B to a new level c>d . This must be accomplished
in period 1 (i.e., the bank cannot wait until period 2). In general, a bank can increase its capital
ratio by increasing the numerator of its capital ratio (i.e., by issuing equity) and/or by decreasing
the denominator (i.e., by selling loans, not initiating new loans, not renewing old loans). Here,
the bank can decrease the denominator of its capital ratio only by selling loans.
We assume that the bank has enough of each loan as to be able to sell only one type of loan
and satisfy its new capital requirement.4 Hence, the bank can satisfy its new capital requirement
by pursuing one of the following strategies: (i) issue E of new equity, (ii) sell proportion b of
loan 1, (iii) sell proportion b of loan 2, and (iv) sell some riskless combination of the two loans.





Instead, if strategy (ii) is pursued, b must be such that
c =
EB + b(L1M − L1B)
L2B +( 1− b)L1B
. (6)
Note that in the numerator, b(L1M −L1B) is the gain (if L1M >L 1B)o rl o s s( i fL1M <L 1B)o n
the sale of loan 1 which is reﬂected in the book value of equity. The cash obtained from the sale
is kept on the balance sheet until period 2, when it is used to repay debt.5 Finally, if strategy
(iii) is pursued, b must be such that
c =
EB + b(L2M − L2B)
L1B +( 1− b)L2B
. (7)





4Since the purpose of the paper is to study the bank’s choice of loan to sell under diﬀerent assumptions about
the correlation structure of loan returns, this assumption guarantees that the bank’s choice will not be constrained
by factors other than those the paper attempts to analyze. Nonetheless, we will discuss later on how our results
would be aﬀected if we were to relax this assumption.
5The bank will not use the cash obtained from selling existing loans to acquire new loans since this would defy
the reason for which the loans were sold in the ﬁrst place (i.e., to increase its equity-to-assets ratio).
5As in Myers and Majluf (1984), the bank’s managers and the investors are assumed to be
risk neutral.6 The maximization problem of the bank’s managers and the investors will be
described in turn below. In period 1, the managers must decide which strategy to pursue. We
assume that the management acts for the best interest of the existing shareholders (i.e., those
who hold shares at the beginning of period 1 prior to any new equity issue). Moreover, the
existing shareholders are assumed to be passive (i.e., they “sit tight” if stock is issued; thus the
issue goes to a diﬀerent group of investors). This is a standard Myers and Majluf (1984) setup.
To formalize the bank’s managers maximization problem, we deﬁne V2 as the market value
of existing shareholder’s wealth in period 2 and V2j as the market value of V2 given the choice
of strategy j in period 1. The optimal strategy is chosen from the set I = {I1,I 2,I E,I w} of
possible strategies in period 1, where I1 is the strategy of selling proportion b of loan 1, I2 is
the strategy of selling proportion b of loan 2, IE is the strategy of selling equity, and Iw is the




If two or more strategies result in the same V2, we assume that the bank management chooses
the strategy that maximizes the wealth of existing shareholders in period 1. To formalize this,
we deﬁne V1 to be the market value of existing shareholders wealth in period 1 and V1j to be
the value of V1 given the choice of strategy j in period 1. Hence, when more than one strategy
solves (9), the chosen strategy should also solve
max
j∈I∗ V1, (10)
where I∗ is the set of strategies that solves (9).
We will now describe the investors maximization problem. In period 1, the investors pur-
chase loans or equity in order to maximize their wealth in period 2. However, they are at an
6The bank’s stockholders and the investors will behave as if they are risk neutral if we assume that outside of
this model they hold suﬃciently large and diversiﬁed portfolios as to achieve perfect risk-pooling.
6informational disadvantage. In period 1, the bank’s managers know the values of the two loans
in period 2, while the investors do not observe these values until period 2. In period 1, the
investors know what are the possible values in period 2 and thus they form expectations upon
which they base their decisions in period 1. Note that the paper takes this information asym-
metry as given and side-steps the question of how much information managers should release.
Hence, the underlying assumption is that transmitting information is prohibitively costly. Obvi-
ously, the distortions introduced because of the asymmetric information would disappear if the
managers could convey their special information to the market.
Suppose that in period 2 there are two equally possible states of nature for each loan: the
market value of loan 1 can increase or decrease by δα and the market value of loan 2 can increase
or decrease by α, where 0 <δ<1 and α>0. This implies that in period 1 the expected future
value of each loan is equal to its market value in period 1 (which is consistent with equation 2)
and that the two loans have the same expected future value (which is consistent with equation
3). If we assume that the correlation structure of loan returns is negative (i.e., in period 2, one
of the two loans appreciates whereas the other loan depreciates), then Table 1 below describes
the possibilities with which investors are faced in period 2.
Table 1: The correlation structure of loan returns is negative
Market Value in Period 1 Market Value in Period 2
High Quality Scenario Low Quality Scenario
Loan 1 L1M L1M(1 − δα) L1M(1 + δα)
Loan 2 L2M L2M(1 + α) L2M(1 − α)
According to Table 1, there are two equally possible states of nature in period 2: the “high
quality scenario” and the “low quality scenario”. The high (low) quality scenario is one in which
the average market value of the bank’s loan portfolio increases (decreases) from period 1 to
period 2. In period 1, the investors know what are the two possible scenarios described above,
7but they do not know which one will be realized so they assign a 0.5 probability to each one
of them. Note, however, that whether it will be the high or the low quality scenario that will
prevail, it depends on whether loan 2 appreciates or depreciates in period 2, since it is the riskier
of the two loans and L1M = L2M.
If, instead, we assume that the correlation structure of loan returns is positive (i.e., in period
2, both loans appreciate or depreciate), then Table 2 below describes the possibilities with which
investors are faced in period 2.
Table 2: The correlation structure of loan returns is positive
Market Value in Period 1 Market Value in Period 2
High Quality Scenario Low Quality Scenario
Loan 1 L1M L1M(1 + δα) L1M(1 − δα)
Loan 2 L2M L2M(1 + α) L2M(1 − α)
Note that in Table 1 the correlation coeﬃcient (ρ) between the markets values of loan 1 and
loan 2 is equal to −1, while in Table 2 it is equal to 1. Since the bank has only two loans,
the correlation coeﬃcient between loan 1 and loan 2 fully characterizes the correlation structure
of the bank’s loan portfolio.7 In particular, ρ =1represents a case where all loans (two in
this case) are positively correlated with each other: they all appreciate or they all depreciate.
Instead, ρ = −1 represents a case where at each possible scenario some loans appreciate and
some depreciate. Using the cases described in Table 1 and Table 2, it will be shown that the
bank’s optimal choice of ﬁnancing is diﬀerent. It is important to point out that the portfolios
described in Table 1 and Table 2 diﬀer only with respect to their correlation structure; all other
properties regarding the bank’s portfolio are the same.
The risk neutral investors are willing to purchase a security oﬀered by the bank if the
7If there were more than two loans, we would have to take into account the correlation of each pair in order
to fully characterize the correlation structure of a bank’s portfolio.
8security’s expected return is at least equal to the expected return from their best alternative.
Here, if the investors do not purchased the security oﬀered by the bank, they can invest their
funds in a riskless asset that pays a real interest rate r, where r is normalized to 0. In addition,
it is assumed that capital markets are perfect and eﬃcient with respect to publicly available
information and that there are no transaction costs in issuing equity or selling loans. Hence, at
the equilibrium the investors will buy the security oﬀered by the bank at a price that will imply
an expected return of zero (i.e., equal to the return from their best alternative).
Finally, we assume that bank debt is risky (i.e., there is a positive probability of bankruptcy).
In particular, it is assumed that all bank debt matures in period 2 and that in the worst case
scenario the bank will default on its debt. Since r =0 , the amount of debt that has to be repaid
in period 2 is equal to the face value of debt in period 1, DB.T h u s ,w h e nρ = −1
L1M(1 − δα)+L2M(1 + α) >D B (11)
L1M(1 + δα)+L2M(1 − α) <D B. (12)
The ﬁrst inequality states that if the high quality scenario is realized, the market value of the
two loans in period 2 exceeds the face value of the bank’s debt. Hence, the bank can repay its
debt in full. The second inequality states that if the low quality scenario is realized, the market
value of the bank’s portfolio in period 2 is lower than the face value of its debt. The bank, in
this case, will go bankrupt. Likewise, when ρ =1the equivalents of equations (11) and (12) are
L1M(1 + δα)+L2M(1 + α) >D B (13)
L1M(1 −δα)+L2M(1 − α) <D B. (14)
Given equations (12) and (14), the bank will be bankrupt in period 2 if the low quality
scenario prevails. However, the choice of security to sell in period 1 could improve or worsen the
bank’s ability to repay its debt. For example, suppose that ρ =1and that the bank’s managers
know that the low quality scenario will prevail in period 2 and they choose to sell proportion b
9of loan 2. If the investors do not know which scenario will prevail, they are willing to buy loan
2 at its expected value (i.e., L2M). Hence, V2I2 is given by
V2I2 =m a x{0,b L 2M + L1M(1 − δα)+( 1− b)L2M(1 − α) − DB},
which might be positive or zero depending on the parameter values. If V2I2 > 0, selling loan
2 prevents the bank from a sure bankruptcy. The intuition is simple: because of asymmetric
information the bank is able to sell loan 2 at a favorable price before a major loss in its market
value. However, if the investors knew that the low quality scenario will prevail they would be
willing to pay only bL2M(1 − α). Hence, V1I2 and thus V2I2 would immediately drop to zero
since it is common knowledge that under these conditions the bank will be bankrupt in period
2. In particular, V2I2 is given by
V2I2 =m a x{0,b L 2M(1 − α)+L1M(1 − δα)+( 1− b)L2M(1 − α)}⇒
V2I2 =m a x{0,L 1M(1 − δα)+L2M(1 − α)},
which is equal to zero since L1M(1 − δα)+L2M(1 − α) <D B.
In some cases, selling a certain security might worsen the bank’s ability to repay its debt.
For example, suppose that ρ =1and the bank’s managers know that the high quality scenario
will prevail and they choose to sell loan 2. Since the investors do not know which scenario will
prevail, they are willing to buy loan 2 at its expected value (i.e., L2M). Hence, V2I2 is given by
V2I2 =m a x{0,b L 2M + L1M(1 − δα)+( 1− b)L2M(1 + α) − DB},
which might be positive or zero depending on the parameter values. If V2L2 =0 , selling loan 2
worsens the bank’s ability to repay its debt (i.e., before the sale the bank was able to repay its
debt for sure, while after the sale it is not always able). The intuition is simple: because of the
asymmetric information the bank has to sell loan 2 at an unfavorable price (i.e., a price that
takes into account the possibility of the low quality scenario).
103E x p e c t e d p a y o ﬀ s
In this section we calculate the existing shareholder’s gain/loss from each strategy assuming
that the bank is willing to issue equity or sell any of the two loans regardless of whether the
favorable or unfavorable state occurs. This implies that investors are willing to buy any of the
three securities at their expected values (e.g., when investors buy proportion b of loan 1 they
are willing to pay up to bL1M since there is a ﬁfty percent chance that the loan they are buying
will have a value equal to bL1M(1 + δα) and a ﬁfty percent chance that it will have a value
equal to bL1M(1 − δα)). As it will become clear later on this assumption does not hold at the
equilibrium since the bank will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to supply each security in some states and not
in some others. Hence, the bank’s choice will involve signaling, which in turn will aﬀect the
bank’s choice of security to sell at the equilibrium. However, this assumption is maintained in
this section in order to calculate the gain/loss from each strategy and examine what the bank
would like to sell under each scenario. When in section four we study the model’s equilibrium
we will take into account the eﬀect of signaling in the bank’s choice of security to sell.
Before proceeding it is important to point out that the existing shareholder’s gain/loss from
selling equity will be calculated under two alternative assumptions, depending on whether the
new equity issue saves the bank under the low quality scenario or not:
Assumption 1: In period 2 the bank can repay its debt in full under the low quality scenario if
it issues an amount E of new equity in period 1. This implies that L1M(1+δα)+L2M(1−α)+E>
DB when ρ = −1 and L1M(1 − δα)+L2M(1 − α)+E>D B when ρ =1 .
Assumption 2: In period 2 the bank can not repay its debt in full under the low quality
scenario if it issues an amount E of new equity in period 1. This implies that L1M(1 + δα)+
L2M(1 − α)+E<D B when ρ = −1 and L1M(1 − δα)+L2M(1 −α)+E<D B when ρ =1 .
This distinction is necessary because the price investors are willing to pay for equity depends
11on whether assumption 1 or 2 holds, since in the event of bankruptcy equity holders receive
whatever is left after the bank repays its debt in full. In the next subsection we will explain in
detail how the price investors are willing to pay for equity is determined.
3.1 Negative correlation
Table 3 below describes the existing shareholder’s gains/losses under each possible scenario when
the correlation structure of loan returns is negative.
Table 3: Existing Shareholder’s Gains/Losses when ρ = −1
High Quality Scenario Low Quality Scenario
Strategy Assumption 1 Assumption 2 Assumption 1 Assumption 2
I1 bL1Mδα bL1Mδα −bL1Mδα −bL1Mδα
I2 −bL1Mα −bL1Mα bL1Mα bL1Mα
IE −bL1Mα(1 − δ)/2 −E bL1Mα(1 − δ)/2 E
Iw 0 0 0 0
The calculations for strategies I1 and I2 are straightforward. For example, suppose that
under the high quality scenario the bank sells proportion b of loan 1 for its expected value in
period 2 (i.e., bL1M). In this case, the bank’s existing shareholders will gain bL1Mδα, since the
market value of loan 1 will decrease by δα in period 2. Instead, if the bank sells proportion b
of loan 2 for its expected value, bL2M, the bank’s existing shareholders will forgo the increase
in the value of loan 2 in the next period. Hence, their loss from strategy I2 will equal −bL2Mα.
Since L1M = L2M, −bL2Mα can be written as −bL1Mα to facilitate comparison with loss/gain
from I1. The existing shareholder’s gain/loss under the low quality scenario are derived in a
similar way since the two scenarios are symmetric.
The expected gains/losses from strategies I1 and I2 are feasible, since investors are willing
to buy loan 1 or loan 2 at their expected prices. For example, buying loan 1 is a fair deal for
12investors since their expected payoﬀ is equal to the opportunity cost of their money. Since the
existing shareholder’s gain is the investor’s loss and vice versa, the investor’s expected gain is
Investor s Expected Gain =0 .5[bL1Mαδ]+0 .5[−bL1Mαδ]=0 .
Given that r =0and that investors are risk neutral, an expected gain of zero is one that satisﬁes
investors.8 It is straightforward to show that the same is true for loan 2.
The calculations of the shareholder’s gains/losses from an equity issue are more complicated
and deserve some discussion. Recall from the deﬁnitions that V1IE is the market value of existing
shareholders shares in period 1 if the bank sells new equity in period 1. Clearly, V1IE will
be determined by the price at which the new investors are willing to buy new equity. New
shareholders realize that the market value of debt increases when new equity is issued and they
adjust the price at which they are willing to buy.9 However, since in period 1 investors do not
know which scenario will be realized, they calculate the expected value of debt after the equity
issue, DMnew, by assigning a probability of 0.5 to each of the two possible scenarios.
Under assumption 1, the market value of debt in period 1 increases from its initial level
DM to its risk free level DB, since the equity issue enables the bank to repay its debt in full
under the low quality scenario. Hence, DMnew is given by
DMnew =0 .5DB +0 .5DB = DB.
The new shareholders want this increase in debt value to be paid by the existing shareholders
(i.e., they want V1IE to be worth its pre-issue market value EM less the increase in the market
value of debt DB − DM). Consequently, V1IE is given by
V1IE = EM − (DB − DM) (15)
8These assumptions could be relaxed to allow for a positive interest rate and risk averse investors. However,
the model’s equilibrium and economic intuition would remain unchanged. Hence, the assumptions are retained
in the interest of simplicity.
9The market value of debt increases because an equity issues makes more funds available to repay the bank’s
debt. This is because debt holders are senior claimants and equity holders are junior claimants (i.e., equity holders
receive whatever is left after a bank repays its debt in full).
13Given that DM =0 5 DB +0 .5[L1M(1 + δα)+L2M(1 − α)], we can express V1E as
V1IE = EM − 0.5{DB − [L1M(1 + δα)+L2M(1 − α)]}, (16)
where 0.5{DB − [L1M(1 + δα)+L2M(1 − α)]} measures the expected shortfall of existing funds
that will be covered with funds from the new equity issue.
The new shareholders will pay E for new shares in period 1 if they receive a proportion k of





In this case, the existing shareholders own a proportion 1 − k =
V1IE
V1IE+E of the total shares
outstanding after the new equity issue in period 1. Since the total market value of all shares
after the new equity issue is V1IE + E, the market value of the existing shareholders shares is
(1 − k)(V1IE + E)=V1IE. Hence, the new shareholders achieve their objective.
Note that for a given amount E, equations (15) and (17) determine the price of each share.
In particular, the higher the increase in the market value of debt DB − DM, the higher the
proportion k of the total shares that the new shareholders get for a given amount E, and thus
the lower the price of each share. In addition, it is clear from equation (16) that the price of
each share depends on the market value of the bank’s portfolio in the low quality scenario. In
particular, the lower the market value of the bank’s loan portfolio in the worst case scenario
the larger the shortfall and thus the lower the price the new shareholders are willing to pay for
each share. This means that the correlation structure of loan returns aﬀects the price of equity.
Everything else equal, the value of the bank’s portfolio (in the low quality scenario) is lower
when ρ =1than when ρ = −1. In particular, when ρ =1both loans depreciate in value, while
when ρ = −1 one loan depreciates and the other appreciates mitigating the total drop.
If new equity is issued under these conditions, the gain to the bank’s existing shareholders
will be given by the diﬀerence between the value of the new equity in period 1 and the value
of the new equity in period 2. This implies that under the high quality scenario the existing
14shareholder’s loss is given by
Existing Shareholder s Loss = E − k[L1M(1 −δa)+L2M(1 + a) − DB + E], (18)
substituting equations (2), (3), (8), (15) and (17) into (18) we get




Similarly, under the low quality scenario the existing shareholder’s gain is




We will now calculate the existing shareholder’s gain/loss from selling equity under assump-
tion 2. Under assumption 2, new shareholders know that in period 1 the market value of debt
after an equity issue will increase from DM ( t h eo r i g i n a ll e v e l )t os o m en e wl e v e lDMnew. In this
case, DMnew <D B because the bank will not be able to repay its debt in full if the low quality
scenario prevails. Hence, V1IE is given by
V1IE = EM − (DMnew −DM), (19)
where
DMnew =0 .5DB +0 .5[L1M(1 + δα)+L2M(1 − α)+E] (20)
DM =0 .5DB +0 .5[L1M(1 + δα)+L2M(1 − α)]. (21)
Using equations (20) and (21) we can express V1IE as
V1IE = EM − 0.5E. (22)
In this case, the expected shortfall that will be covered with funds from the new equity issue
is ﬁxed and equal to the amount they contributed (i.e., if the low quality scenario prevails, the
bank will go bankrupt and they will loose all their funds). Hence, the price of each share does
not depend on the value of the bank’s portfolio in the worst case scenario. This implies that
under assumption 2 the correlation of loan returns does not aﬀect the cost of issuing equity.
15Under these conditions, the existing shareholder’s loss under the high quality scenario is
Existing Shareholder s Loss = E − k[L1M(1 −δa)+L2M(1 + a) − DB + E] (23)
substituting equations (2), (3), (8), (19), (20), and (17) into (23) we get
Existing Shareholder sL o s s= −E.
Similarly, under the low quality scenario the existing shareholder’s gain is given by
Existing Shareholder sG a i n= E.
Buying equity is a fair deal for investors since their expected payoﬀ is equal to the opportunity
cost of their money. In particular, under assumption 1, the investor’s expected gain is














while under assumption 2 is
Investor s Expected Gain =0 .5(E)+0 .5(−E)=0 .
Finally, we consider the expected gain/loss from mixed strategy Iw, which involves selling
a riskless combination of the two loans. Such a combination must be considered because it
eliminates the asymmetric information problems and thus it could potentially dominate the
other strategies. When ρ = −1, there exists a combination of loans which involves no risk (i.e.,
a combination that has the same value in period 1 and period 2 regardless of which scenario





To prove that this combination is riskless, suppose that the bank sells this combination of
l o a n si np e r i o d1a n dt h a ti np e r i o d2t h elow quality scenario prevails. In that case, the
16value of this combination in period 2 is given by
wbL1M(1 +δα)+( 1− w)bLM2(1 − α).
Substituting into the above expression the deﬁnition of w and equation (3) we get
wbL1M +( 1− w)bL2M,
which clearly shows that the value of this combination in period 2 is equal to the value for which
it is sold in period 1. The same is true under the high quality scenario. In particular,
wbL1M(1 − δα)+( 1− w)bL2M(1 + a)=wbL1M +( 1− w)bL2M.
Hence, this combination is indeed riskless and thus it involves no gain or loss for the bank’s
existing shareholders.
3.2 Positive correlation
Table 4 describes the existing shareholder’s gains/losses under each possible scenario when ρ =1 .
The calculations are not presented since they are similar to those described in the previous section
for ρ = −1. All expected gains reported in Table 4 are feasible for the same reasons explained
in the previous section. Note, however, that Table 4 does not report the results for a mixed
strategy. This is because no such riskless combination exists when ρ =1 .
Table 4: Existing Shareholder’s Gains/Losses when ρ =1
High Quality Scenario Low Quality Scenario
Strategy Assumption 1 Assumption 2 Assumption 1 Assumption 2
I1 −bL1Mδα −bL1Mδα bL1Mδα bL1Mδα
I2 −bL1Mα −bL1Mα bL1Mα bL1Mα
E −bL1Mα(δ +1 ) /2 −E bL1Mα(δ +1 ) /2 E
174 Equilibrium
We now derive the bank’s optimal choice of security to sell at the equilibrium assuming that
the bank’s managers and the investors are rational economic agents maximizing their objective
functions conditional on whatever information they have in period 1.
4.1 Negative correlation
Comparing the gains/losses reported in Table 3 we can rank the bank’s preferences. Table 5
below shows the bank’s preferences in descending order.
Table 5: Descending order of preferences when ρ = −1.
High Quality Scenario Low Quality Scenario
Assumption 1 I1, Iw, IE, I2 I2, IE, Iw, I1
Assumption 2 I1, Iw, IE, I2 I2, IE, Iw, I1 if bL1Mδα > E
IE, I2, Iw, I1 if bL1Mδα < E
Given the above ranking of preferences, if the bank’s managers know that the high quality
scenario will prevail they would like to sell loan 1, irrespective of whether assumption 1 or 2 holds
for equity. This is because I1 is the only strategy that results in a gain for the bank’s existing
shareholders. On the contrary, if the bank’s managers know that the low quality scenario will
prevail and assumption 1 holds, they would like to sell loan 2 since it is the strategy with the
largest gain. Instead, if they know that the low quality scenario will prevail and assumption 2
holds, they would like to sell loan 2 or equity depending on whether bL1Mδα ≷ E.
However, this can not be the equilibrium solution. In particular, the bank’s choice under the
high quality scenario is always diﬀerent form its choice under the low quality scenario. Hence, if
the bank chooses anything else other than its optimal strategy under the high quality scenario it
will give the signal to investors that it is the low quality scenario that will prevail. As mentioned
earlier, investors observe the values reported in Table 1 (i.e., they know what are the various
18possibilities; what they do not know is which one will be realized). Hence, they can solve the
bank’s optimization problem and if they observe the bank selling anything else other than its
optimal strategy under the high quality scenario, they think that it is the low quality scenario
that will prevail. In that case, they are willing to buy the security oﬀered by the bank only at
the price they think it will have in period 2. Under these circumstances, it is straightforward to
show that the bank will always choose the optimal strategy under the high quality scenario in
order to postpone bankruptcy for one period. This leads to proposition Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 When the correlation structure of loan returns is negative the unique equilibrium
is one in which proportion b of loan 1 is sold.
Proof: It will be shown that under each possible scenario the bank will not deviate from the
postulated equilibrium. The proof is divided in two steps.
Step 1: It will be shown that if the bank’s managers know that the high quality scenario will
prevail, they have no incentive to deviate from the postulated equilibrium. Suppose that the
bank’s managers sell proportion b of loan 1, V2I1 is given by
V2I1 =m a x{0,b L 1M +( 1−b)L1M(1 − δα)+L2M(1 + α) − DB}, (24)
which is positive since equation (11) holds.
Given the out of equilibrium belief, if the bank chooses to sell anything other than I1 it will
give the signal to investors that it is the low quality scenario that will prevail. In particular, if
the bank decides to sell proportion b of loan 2 it will be able to sell it only at bL2M(1 −a) (i.e.,
since investors think that the low quality scenario will prevail, they are not willing to pay more
than the value of loan 2 under the low quality scenario). Investors also believe that the bank
will be bankrupt in period 2, since they think that the bank’s condition is described by
bL2M(1 − α)+L1M(1 + δα)+( 1− b)L2M(1 − α) − DB ⇒
19L1M(1 + δα)+L2M(1 −α) − DB,
which according to equation (12) is negative. Since investors believe that the bank will be
bankrupt in period 2, the market value of its equity will immediately drop to zero (i.e., V1I1 =0 .
and thus,V2I2 =0 ). Given that V2I1 >V 2I2, the bank will not deviate by selling loan 2.
We will now show that the bank’s managers will also not deviate by issuing equity. Given
the out of equilibrium belief, an equity issue signals to investors that the low quality scenario
will prevail. Under such circumstances, investors are unwilling to buy equity because they think
that their payoﬀ in period 2 will be less than the amount they contributed in period 1. To prove
this, note that if the bank issues new equity, the market value of both old and new stake in
period 2 under the low quality scenario is
L1M(1 + δα)+L2M(1 − α)+E − DB.
Investors believe that this value is less than E because under the low quality scenario
L2M(1 + δα)+L2M(1 − α) <D B.
Thus, investors will not buy new equity worth E in period 1 even if they are oﬀered 100%
ownership. In other words, if investors think that equity in period 2 will have zero market value,
they are not willing to buy equity for any positive price. Hence, selling is not feasible.
So far we proved that under the high quality scenario the bank will not deviate from the
postulated equilibrium. We will now turn to the low quality scenario.
Step 2: It will be shown that if the bank’s managers know that low quality scenario will prevail,
they do not have an incentive to deviate from the postulated equilibrium because selling anything
other than loan 1 will give the signal to investors that the low quality scenario will prevail. For
the same reasons as in step 1, selling loan 2 when investors think that the low quality scenario
will prevail results in V1I1 = V2I2 =0 . If, instead, the bank chooses to sell proportion b of loan
201, V2I2 is given by
V2I2 =m a x{0,b L 1M +( 1− b)L1M(1 + δα)+L2M(1 − α)},
w h i c hi se q u a lt oz e r o( u s i n ge q u a t i o n( 1 2 )i ti se a s yt os h o wt h a tbL1M +(1−b)L1M(1+δα)+
L2M(1 − α) < 0). However, since I1 does not signal to investors that the low quality scenario
will prevail, V1I1 > 0. Given that V2I2 = V2I1 =0and V1I1 >V 1I2, the bank will not deviate
from the postulated equilibrium by selling loan 2. Finally, for the same reasons as in step 1,
selling equity at any positive price is not feasible.  
4.2 Positive Correlation
Comparing the gains/losses reported in Table 4 we can rank the bank’s preferences. Table 6
below shows the preferences of each bank in descending order of preference.
Table 6: Descending order of preferences when ρ =1 .
High Quality Scenario Low Quality Scenario
Assumption 1 I1, IE, I2 I2, IE, I1
Assumption 2 IE, I1, I2 if bL1Mδα > E I2, I1,I E if bL1Mδα > E
I1, IE,I 2 if bL1Mδα < E I2 or IE,I 1 if bL1Mδα < E
Given the above ranking of preferences, if assumption 1 holds and the bank’s managers know
that the high quality scenario will prevail, they would like to sell loan 1 in order to minimize
the loss for their existing shareholders. On the contrary, if they know that the low quality
scenario will prevail, they would like to sell loan 2 in order to maximize the gain for their
existing shareholders. Similarly, if assumption 2 holds and the bank’s managers know that the
high quality scenario will prevail, they would like to issue equity if bL1Mδα > E and they would
like to sell loan 1 if bL1Mδα < E. If, instead, they know that the low quality scenario will prevail
they would like to sell loan 2 if bL1Mδα > E and they would like to sell loan 2 or to issue equity
if bL1Mδα < E, where their choice between loan 2 and equity depends on whether bL1Mα ≷ E.
21It is clear that also in this case the bank’s choice under the high quality scenario is always
diﬀerent form its choice under the low quality scenario. Hence, if the bank deviates from its
optimal strategy under the high quality scenario it will give the signal that it is the low quality
scenario that will prevail and the investors will adjust the price for which they are willing to buy.
It is straightforward to show that under these conditions the bank will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
deviate from its optimal strategy under the high quality scenario, even if they know that it is
the low quality scenario that will prevail in period 2. This leads to Propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 2 When the correlation stucture of loan returns is positve and assumption 1 holds
for equity, the unique equilibrium is one which proportion b of loan 1 is sold.
Proposition 3 When the correlation stucture of loan returns is positive and assumption 2
holds for equity, the unique equilibrium depends on the relationship between bLM1δα and E.
If bLM1δα < E, then proportion b of loan 1 is sold at the equilibrium. Instead, if bLM1δα > E
then equity will be issued at the equilibrium.
Formal proofs of proposition 2 and 3 are not presented because they are very similar to
the proof of proposition 1. The rational of all three propositions is straightforward. At the
equilibrium the bank’s managers will always choose to follow the optimal strategy under the
high quality scenario because they will otherwise give the signal to investors that it is the low
quality scenario that will prevail in period 2. This out of equilibrium belief is possible because
the optimal strategy under the high quality scenario is always diﬀerent from the optimal strategy
under the low quality scenario.
5 Conclusions
This paper considered a setting where a bank can sell loans or issue equity in order to increase
its equity-to-assets ratio. The paper’s focus is on describing the bank’s choice of ﬁnancing
22under conditions of asymmetric information, given diﬀerent assumptions about the correlation
structure of loan returns. Previous work on this issue considered only the expected value (and
not the correlation structure) of loan returns.
The model presented here considered two cases: one in which there is perfect negative
correlation between loan 1 and loan 2 (ρ = −1) and one in which there is perfect positive
correlation (ρ =1 ). Since the bank has only two loans, the correlation coeﬃcient, ρ, between
loan 1 and loan 2 fully characterizes the correlation structure of the bank’s loan portfolio. If
there were more than two loans, we would have to take into account the correlation of each
pair in order to fully characterize the correlation structure of a bank’s portfolio. Hence, in more
general terms ρ =1should be thought as a case where all loans are positively correlated with
each other: they all appreciate or they all depreciate. Instead, ρ = −1 should be thought as a
case where at each possible scenario some loans appreciate and some depreciate.
As demonstrated by Propositions 1 to 3, the equilibrium in each case is diﬀerent. In partic-
ular, when ρ = −1 there exists a loan that the bank can sell so that its existing shareholders
gain under the high quality scenario. No such loan exists when ρ =1 . In particular, when
ρ =1selling any of the available securities involves a loss for the bank’s existing shareholders.
Thus, the bank in this case tries to minimize the loss for its existing shareholders. According to
Propositions 2 and 3 this choice depends on whether assumption 1 or 2 holds for equity (i.e., on
whether issuing equity allows (or not) the bank to avoid bankruptcy under worst case scenario).
When assumption 1 holds, the bank ﬁnds it optimal to sell its less risky loan (i.e., loan 1)
instead of loan 2 or equity. The rationale is simple. Loan 1 clearly dominates loan 2 because it
varies less. However, loan 1 also dominates equity. In particular, when assumption 1 holds the
loss from an equity issue depends positively on the variance of the bank’s total loan portfolio.
Instead, the loss from selling a loan depends only on its own variance. Since in this case the
variance of the bank’s portfolio is greater than the variance of its less risky loan, the bank ﬁnds
it optimal to sell its less risky loan. When assumption 2 holds, the bank will either choose loan 1
23or equity depending on which one involves the smallest loss for the bank’s existing shareholders
(i.e., bL1Mδα ≶ E). Note that an equity issue could be preferred in this case, because the loss
from equity does not depend on the variance of the bank’s portfolio. Since the bank will be
bankrupt for sure if the low quality scenario prevails, the loss for the bank’s existing shareholders
is ﬁxed and equal to E. Hence, if the loss from selling loan 1 (bL1Mδα)i sh i g h e rt h a nt h el o s s
from equity (E) the bank will ﬁnd it optimal to sell loan 1 and vice versa.
Let us now discuss which case is more realistic (i.e., ρ =1or −1). In practice, it is unlikely
that a bank will have either favorable or unfavorable inside information about all of its loans.
This might happen occasionally but is unlikely to happen on a consistent basis; if it did, it would
imply that some banks are consistently undervalued or overvalued. It is more likely that a bank
will have favorable inside information for some of its loans and unfavorable inside information
for some of its other loans. As far as this is true, the results suggest that the bank will always
prefer to sell loans instead of equity.
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